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> abstract • What Murphy and Gash are 
attempting to do is to solve a significant 
problem some students have being suc-
cessful in school, one that is not often 
addressed in any significant way. The lan-
guage used to describe the lessons has 
some significant departures from radical 
constructivism. It is, no doubt, beneficial 
that the students in the study may have 
developed improvements in self-image, 
but, as seen in other work, the applica-
tion of radical constructivism to develop 
and extend the work started in the study 
could result in more and more lasting 
improvements.
Handling Editor • Alexander Riegler
« 1 » In the target article, Fiona Mur-
phy and Hugh Gash are working with stu-
dents who think they cannot be successful 
at school tasks. Murphy and Gash are trying 
to change the students’ conceptions of them-
selves.
the need to cultivate a growth 
mindset in students
« 2 » One of the chief problems in 
schools is that children learn damaging 
views of themselves and their relationship to 
knowledge. We know that, early on, young 
girls “learn” that they are not good at math 
and science in school. While this may have 
begun to change, it has not stopped. Stu-
dents who show some potential at some-
thing in school are easily “forgiven” for not 
doing well at something else. A prevailing 
notion is that some people are “just good” 
at some things, while others are not. This is 
soaked up as much by boys as girls and con-
tinues as they grow up to be young women 
and young men. It is as if we must be thank-
ful for what small successes we see. How-
ever, that the result is substantial damage to 
our culture seems to go unseen. Of course, 
the damage is in the eye of the beholder. 
There are those who generally have sway 
over the schools, who benefit by having the 
“I can’t” self-image be the result of schooling 
for many students (Bowles & Gintis 1976).
« 3 » I agree strongly with Murphy and 
Gash in the sense that our students are not 
served well by what they learn in school 
about their own abilities in school, their re-
lationship to knowledge and the nature of 
knowledge. Students probably learn these 
things in more lasting ways than anything 
“taught” to them as content in school. Ev-
ery year in school from K-16 (kindergarten 
through the 4th year in college), at least, in-
structors wonder: what were these students 
doing last year, why can’t they do what they 
are supposed to have learned last year? This 
seems to have been going on for decades, as 
can be attested by teachers of long standing. 
And, these teachers will recall, when they 
were just beginning, teachers of long stand-
ing back then saying the same things.
« 4 » In my own field, physics educa-
tion research, since about 1980, we have 
been documenting that students come to us 
already having constructed understandings 
of the physical phenomena we deal with in 
our introductory courses (Dykstra 2005). 
They have constructed a kind of toolbox 
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of conceptions, which they extend to new 
phenomena they encounter without close 
examination because they have never been 
engaged in close comparison between their 
conceptions and their experiential worlds. 
We also find that standard teaching results 
in very little change in these initial concep-
tions through three or four repeats of this 
type of conventional instruction on the 
same topics at different introductory levels. 
So, while they form lasting impressions of 
themselves as to what kind of learners they 
are, they leave 12 or more years of schooling 
having hardly changed their understanding 
of the issues in the content of their classes 
at all. Having taught students from 11th and 
12th grade in American high schools, to 
majors across the full range of majors at two 
different universities, to teachers in gradu-
ate courses preparing to teach the physical 
sciences in American secondary schools, in 
my experience I know this situation is not 
unique to physics courses.
« 5 » One way to understand how this 
state of affairs is continued is to consider 
what the conventional view of teaching is. 
The conventional view can be put something 
like this (Dykstra 2005: 54):
Conventional view: Teaching is the 
presentation of the established canon 
of knowledge by appropriate means for the 
benefit of the deserving.
This is a folk theory, meaning that for a very 
long time it has been generally accepted 
without question, as “just the way things 
are.” Since this is the “way to teach,” stu-
dents who do not seem to get what has been 
presented probably are not among the “de-
serving.” Such students apparently lack the 
requisite mental ability and/or did not work 
sufficiently diligently at acquiring what was 
presented. Out of this view of teaching, the 
evils of schooling come, in particular, blam-
ing the students, which is a source of the “I 
can’t” we see the students have learned by 
the beginning of the study. This folk theory 
is also based on the notion that what is to 
be learned is a commodity that exists out-
side the mind and can be transmitted by 
presentation, a realist notion of the nature 
of knowledge.
« 6 » That folk theory is generally ac-
cepted can be seen in a number of impor-
tant places that reinforce adherence to the 
folk theory. In the uS, teacher prepara-
tion specifications, generally determined 
at the state level, all have these important 
features for issuance of the state license to 
teach: Subject-matter teachers are required 
to earn acceptable grade-point averages in 
courses they are being licensed to teach, 
and in many states an additional privately 
developed exam in the subject that is se-
lected by the state must be passed with a 
state-specified minimum score (to make 
sure the college professors who issued 
the grades were not being too easy on the 
teacher candidates). Do they know the es-
tablished canon? teacher candidates are 
coached at and evaluated for how well they 
can use approved methods of presenta-
tion. Can they present the canon in an ap-
proved way? When teachers at both levels 
are evaluated on their teaching, the evalu-
ator is asked whether the instructor knows 
the subject, and whether the instructor an-
swers every question in a timely manner, 
usually taken as within minutes. At both 
levels the instructor is expected to have a 
detailed listing of topics to be presented. 
At the secondary level, states specify this 
listing and local school systems require 
every teacher of a certain subject to treat 
the same subset of topics on the same day, 
sometimes down to the minute. In recent 
decades, at the higher education level, the 
“evaluators of teaching effectiveness” have 
become the students. These students just 
earning their bachelor’s degrees are asked 
whether PhDs in the subject they are teach-
ing know the subject. These evaluation-tool 
results are used to determine income and 
advancement decisions at the higher edu-
cation levels, but not always in unbiased 
ways. using these methods, the folk theory 
is very firmly enforced.
« 7 » From the list of references provid-
ed by Murphy and Gash, there is something 
that comes to mind, which might be of value 
in thinking about the problem they are at-
tempting to address. In 1970, William Perry 
published a book about his studies with 
Harvard students during their time at that 
institution (Perry 1970, 1981). He saw a pat-
tern repeated by the students as they grew 
cognitively and ethically in college.
« 8 » Perry and his colleagues identi-
fied a series of nine intellectual positions, 
which Perry divided into four stages, with 
respect to knowledge, as the students moved 
through college. The stages Perry and col-
leagues describe are descriptions of the stu-
dents’ apparent thinking based on what they 
observed students saying and writing in the 
interviews Perry conducted. When entering 
college the majority of students do not know 
about RC, so it should not be a surprise that 
they appear to hold a view of the “enterprise” 
of college as about being given “truth,” as 
in absolute truth, for them to know. to get 
to college, students have to be very good at 
remembering truth as it has been revealed 
to them. With relatively infrequent excep-
tions, students in schools in the uS come to 
this intellectual position by graduation from 
high school or before.
« 9 » These stages in Perry’s scheme can 
be described in the following way:
  Dualism refers to the belief that truth is 
known to Authorities and it is the stu-
dents’ role to accept the truth as given 
by these Authorities;
  Multiplicity describes the stage in which 
students become aware of conflicting 
truths, motivating a decision to trust 
their own “gut feeling” and not external 
Authorities;
  Relativism relates to the students’ in-
sight that “gut feelings” are not reliable, 
but they notice that faculty have meth-
ods or approaches that work, at least 
under certain conditions. So, they must 
work out methods to develop and evalu-
ate solutions to problems and proposed 
conclusions;
  Commitment refers to each individual 
student’s decision that each one of them 
is responsible to themselves and others 
around them to make the best decisions 
they can, using methods they have de-
veloped or learned in their experience 
with others.
At this end of the sequence, students recog-
nize that since each of them has this task, 
they may find others have come to different 
conclusions, but they can interact with oth-
ers to find out what led them to those differ-
ent conclusions.
« 10 » Perry had noticed that beginning 
Harvard students seemed to be there for 
different reasons from those of the faculty. 
now, we would say that the students came 
in the Dualism stage, but the faculty were 
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at the Commitment stage. The students 
had come to get Knowledge from Authori-
ties, but the Professors were operating at 
higher stages. Students were frustrated by 
the faculty, because they are seen by the 
students as Authorities who are supposed 
to give them truth – but were not doing so. 
This truth seems to be a kind of privileged 
knowledge not available to the students ex-
cept from Authority. Instead, the faculty are 
inviting students to move from the position 
of absolute realism toward being able to an-
alyze new situations and being able to come 
to decisions they can justify by various 
means about these new situations; i.e., the 
Commitment stage. With persistence from 
the Professors, the students were seen to 
advance through the nine positions in the 
four stages Perry observed. Perry and some 
colleagues developed interview protocols 
and interviewed a large number of students 
through their whole careers at Harvard to 
collect a large data set from which Perry’s 
group was able to make their description 
of the intellectual development of the stu-
dents.
« 11 » My point in bringing this up is 
that Perry’s work shows the evidence of 
growth in the power of the mind. The stu-
dents in Murphy and Gash’s study are most 
likely in the earliest stage of Perry’s posi-
tions, Dualism. How early might young 
students be able to move from Dualism? Q1 
The answer to this question might be very 
useful in advancing the project that starts 
with their study.
« 12 » Also, others have found Perry’s 
Scheme very informative. Mary Belenky 
and colleagues, using his Scheme as a start-
ing point, studied a different population, 
women, since at the time of Perry’s initial 
study, Harvard was an all-male institution 
(Belenky et al. 1997). They looked at women 
college students, but because they were pro-
fessors in Psychology, they also worked in 
other settings, prisons and settings where 
women suffering challenges were being 
helped. Their work with a larger population 
than just male college students at an elite 
university revealed additional positions for 
Perry’s Scheme, such as a stage that might be 
called “Knowledge as Weapon.” This is seen 
with battered women where knowledge is 
used by the abusers to control and psycho-
logically batter the women they are abusing.
Compatibility issues
« 13 » As a radical constructivist, there 
are aspects I have difficulties agreeing with 
in the Murphy and Gash article.
« 14 » In §12, they write: “The lessons 
had a clearly stated learning intention both 
for the teacher and for the teacher to share 
with the children.” What is bothersome here 
is that, in most settings in education, such 
objectives are statements of what the stu-
dents are to know or be able to do as a result 
of instruction. This is all very well and good 
for folk theory approaches to teaching, but it 
is profoundly inappropriate for instruction 
based in radical constructivism (RC).
« 15 » In the same paragraph, the third 
sentence ends with: “[…] and could be ap-
plied to other lessons taught during the 
experimental period in whatever way the 
teacher found appropriate.” We are told 
that the teacher had two years’ teaching ex-
perience. We are not told the nature of the 
teacher’s training to teach. So, we have no 
idea as to what extent the teacher’s training 
included radical constructivism, if any. The 
teacher might have heard or seen the word, 
constructivism, but we know that, if so, it 
was more likely a form of constructivism 
Ernst von Glasersfeld labeled trivial, not dif-
fering in any substantial way from realism. 
It is unlikely that the teacher knew anything 
about the form of constructivism von Gla-
sersfeld labeled radical, and its implications 
for teaching. As such, how could the instruc-
tion in this study be consistent with RC?
« 16 » The problem here is that con-
structivism became a buzzword or fad in 
education, and other fields such as nursing, 
several decades ago. As with many fads, peo-
ple never learn why the word was originally 
coined and what the original meaning was 
intended to be. As a buzzword, it has be-
come fashionable to use the word, but those 
who use it can be seen not to understand the 
original meaning in how they use the word 
and their actions in the name of the word. 
Any developments based on the trivial 
meanings of constructivism are seen not to 
work better than conventional folk teaching, 
motivating the drop of constructivism into 
the oblivion of no new results.
« 17 » The last sentence in §12 reads: 
“What makes the lessons constructivist are 
the opportunities provided to challenge the 
children’s ideas when they found a lesson 
difficult by introducing ideas about how to 
approach whatever it was that was difficult.” 
And in §17, we find: “In this way, the teacher 
could challenge the children’s perceptions of 
their abilities so they had opportunities to 
reflect on and reconfigure their self-con-
cepts.” This might apply in trivial construc-
tivism, but in RC the children should be the 
ones to challenge their own ideas when they 
become aware of a disequilibration. If the 
teacher does the challenging, then the pro-
cess becomes one of following the teacher’s 
lead, entirely consistent with the folk theory 
of teaching. Even less like RC is the teacher 
introducing ideas about how to approach 
what is difficult. Such a strategy sounds very 
vygotskian, with scaffolding and zone of 
proximal development, and so on, but not 
RC.
« 18 » In §17, the third sentence ends 
with: “[…] and introduce the idea of growth 
mindset as a way of thinking about learn-
ing.” If the teacher is introducing the idea, 
then it is not RC instruction, but folk theory 
teaching. In order not to wreck the RC in-
struction, the closest we come is concept 
first, name second. By this is meant, when 
students have constructed the concept for 
themselves, only then can we introduce a 
name for it.
Evaluation
« 19 » The study included in the target 
article appears to have had a positive effect. 
We do not know how long-lasting it will 
be or how transferable it is. The next step 
would be to begin the empirical research. 
This would include: How do the students 
explain their trouble dealing with these dif-
ficulties? Q2  We want to understand the 
students’ understandings of these difficulties 
they have. From these, can we construct an 
understanding of what the students believe 
such that we can predict how they might 
respond to new situations we have not seen 
them in before? Q3
« 20 » I agree with Murphy and Gash 
that all students are different, but the stu-
dents have come out of very similar expe-
riences to those of others in their culture. 
In other situations, on other topics, people 
who are from very different cultures, with 
very different languages, build remarkably 
similar predictions about novel (to them) 
situations about their experiential worlds. 
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For example, English-only speaking stu-
dents from the uS, Spanish-only speaking 
instructors from Mexico, and tibetan-only 
speaking (with maybe a little Sanskrit and a 
bit of some local language in India) tibetan 
Buddhist monks all seem to have very simi-
lar conceptions to explain their physical ex-
periences from their everyday lives.
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> abstract • The optimism of radical con-
structivism is contrasted with the relative 
pessimism of biological determinism in 
the context of educating young children. 
The plasticity of the learning brain is con-
trasted with the relatively fixed intelli-
gence view linked to IQ testing.
Handling Editor • Alexander Riegler
« 1 » In my commentary on Fiona Mur-
phy and Hugh Gash’s target article, I delib-
erately paint with a big brush to situate their 
article in a wider context and to assess its 
pragmatic value. I do this also because my 
main experience is that of a clinician work-
ing with adults with psychological and psy-
chiatric “disorders” where pragmatic results 
are often demanded. I have a background in 
genetics as well as in psychology, education 
and constructivist psychotherapy, but I have 
not been directly involved in school educa-
tion for several decades.
« 2 » This very erudite and well-written 
target article by Murphy and Gash is a chal-
lenge in that it raises many issues within the 
“subjective mind versus the objective brain” 
debate. It does so by the application of con-
structivist theory and praxis to an education-
al setting. The article addresses a pre-post 
research paradigm from the perspectives of 
social learning theory and radical construc-
tivism, looking at seven- to eight-year-old 
pupils and their teacher in an Irish prima-
ry school (§10). This was primarily an ex-
ploratory piece of qualitative research using 
Gregory Bateson’s (1972) learning-to-learn 
frame. unfortunately, there was no compari-
son or control group. Hence its interesting 
but limited findings (research-wise) would 
require more rigorous replication and, as 
the authors themselves stated, by a follow-
up study with greater constructivist content, 
perhaps also including the checking out of 
the participants’ expectations prior to any 
intervention. However, having made these 
observations with respect to their research 
paradigm, my interest is more in some of the 
constructivist theoretical and philosophical 
assumptions inherent in the target article.
« 3 » The radical constructivist under-
pinnings to this qualitative study render 
their approach to education rather idealistic 
– in both connotations of the word “ideal-
istic,” i.e., suggestive of an optimistic ap-
proach, as well as literally meaning an idea 
or mind-based approach. Pupils’ potential 
is emphasised in the sense that “all children 
can learn without limits” (§66). no biologi-
cal determinants are seen to pose unsurpass-
able obstacles to learning. A “growth mind-
set” is fostered by the teacher so that pupils 
“learn to learn.” It is contended that this 
“meta-learning” approach should help pu-
pils with limited resources, be they intellec-
tual or socio-economic, because their brains 
are seen to be so malleable (§47). Thus, radi-
cal constructivism here implies significant 
neural plasticity which is the sine qua non of 
education. neural plasticity has been shown 
to occur ontogenetically, for example in the 
repair of acquired brain damage and during 
reparative re-education (Moucha & Kilgard 
2006; DelMonte & Halpin 2019).
« 4 » For which purpose has the human 
cortex developed a great amount of neural 
plasticity? to answer this question, we need 
to look in the epistemological underpinnings 
of constructivism, starting with George Ber-
keley’s position of “immaterialism” (Berkeley 
1710). It was also referred to as “subjective 
idealism” by several philosophers in the 
monistic metaphysical tradition (Downing 
2011). With Berkeley’s arguably solipsistic 
perspective there is no mind-independent 
reality and no objective essence – only sub-
jective existence. Opposite to Berkeley’s 
subjective idealism we have constructivisti-
cally inspired theories such as George Kelly’s 
personal construct psychology. Kelly with 
his “fundamental postulate” (Kelly 1955: 
46ff) and its various corollaries did assume 
the existence of a “primary reality” (Kenny 
1984: 26; Kenny & DelMonte 1986: 6), which 
is in constant flux, to which our minds, also 
in flux, are trying to adapt by developing per-
sonal construct systems (seen to be second-
ary realities) – but only with varying degrees 
of success. Kelly stated that
“ whatever nature may be, or howsoever the 
quest for truth will turn out in the end, the events 
that we face today are subject to as great a variety 
of constructions as our wits will enable us to con-
trive.” (Kelly 1955: 1f)
